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Executive Summary
When people think of fishing, they probably imagine an independent sea captain and his crew braving the elements in a
small vessel to bring a fresh catch to shore and to our plates. But the current focus of U.S. policy for managing our fisheries, called catch shares, is destroying the way of life of our nation’s fishermen and coastal communities. This time-honored
trade is being replaced by a privatized system that often leaves the future of our nation’s fish, one of our most precious natural
resources, in the hands of a small number of larger operations, whose primary goal is often immediate profit rather than sustainable use and long-term conservation.
The United States lost most of its family farms to the large industrialized agriculture model. Catch shares create similar conditions on our seas by transferring the wealth of our fish populations from the public trust into private hands, by allocating a
percentage quota of the total amount of fish that can be caught in a year and allowing these quota to be leased, bought and
sold. When catch shares are given to fishermen, those who receive the largest initial distribution of shares — or have the most
capital to buy and lease shares — often gain control over the entire fishery. Smaller-scale traditional fishermen are pushed out
of the fishery while larger companies, which often use fishing practices that stress ocean ecosystems, take over.
Proponents of catch shares claim they are the best solution to profitably, safely and sustainably manage our fisheries. In this
report, Food & Water Watch examines these claims and finds them all wanting.

Catch shares cause economic devastation.
Catch shares only increase profits for some fishermen by cutting hundreds of others out of the fishery entirely. Widespread job
loss and reduced wages drag coastal communities that are already struggling in this economy into dire economic situations.
Meanwhile, a privileged few are able to profit from exclusive access to a public resource.

Catch shares fail to sustain the health of our fisheries.
Catch shares are only a way to distribute fish among fishermen and have no built-in sustainability measures — overfishing is
controlled separately by setting limits on the total number of fish that can be caught. In fact, catch shares inherently contain
incentives to use more damaging gear, discard unwanted fish and dismiss adaptive ecosystem-based fishing strategies.

Catch shares fail to achieve legal standards for fishery management.
The federal law governing our nation’s fisheries, the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Management Act, specifies that fishery management must support the long-term economic health of fishing communities, but catch shares are responsible around the
world for destroying the economic health of coastal ports. Further, an international court found that catch shares violated
human rights by creating a privileged class of fishermen in a privatized industry.

Catch shares aren’t fair.
Our nation and our oceans deserve better than a system that results in an unfair giveaway of public resources to private
entities. Fishermen, rather than being cut out of the fishery, should be a key part of the management process. Smart fishery
management can be fair and equitable, maintain public control of the resource, minimize damage to the environment, and
promote a better life for our nation’s fishermen and coastal and fishing communities, and a better product for consumers.

Food & Water Watch

Privatizing U.S. Fisheries
The Wrong Choice

T

he United States’ tradition of fishing is in danger. One by one, our nation’s regional
fisheries are being forced under a management system that pushes smaller-scale
fishermen out of their jobs, leaves crew members scrambling for pay and turns fishing
communities into ghost towns. These systems are called catch shares, individual fishing
quotas, sector management or catch-and-trade programs. They privatize our oceans,
often leaving the future of one of our nation’s most precious natural resources — our
fish — in the hands of a small number of larger fishing firms, whose primary goal is often
immediate profit rather than sustainable use and long-term conservation.

Privatization by Any Other Name
There are many different types of catch share programs,
particularly in the United States, where each program is
designed specifically for an individual fish or group of fish.
In this report, we generally call these “catch shares,” but
they may also be called: limited access privilege programs (LAPPs), individual fishing quotas (IFQs), individual
vessel quotas (IVQs), individual transferable quotas (ITQs),
quota management systems (QMS), sectors or community development quotas (CDQ) (among many other names,
each with their own unique aspects — see the appendix
for details). These programs could be designed to promote sustainability, economic opportunity and fairness,
but the vast majority of catch share regimes privatize the
fishing industry instead, leading to numerous socio-economic and environmental problems.

Catch share programs have been pitched as a way to end
overfishing, motivate resource stewardship, and increase productivity, profits and long-term stability for fishermen. Yet in
practice, these programs fail on all these counts. Worldwide,
catch share programs that privatize fisheries prove unsuccessful and even devastating for fishing communities, the marine
environment and consumers.
Our agricultural system has long operated under extreme
economic pressure to “get big or get out.” Numerous smaller
farms rapidly consolidated into fewer large factory farms over
the course of the last several decades, resulting in the neardeath of the family farm and the loss of food quality, food
safety and consumer choice. Unfortunately, the National
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), the federal government
body responsible for the management and conservation of
our ocean fish populations, is heavily promoting catch share
programs throughout the United States. It seems to be only
a matter of time before our fisheries follow a similar path as
agriculture.
1
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Catch Share Programs in the United States
Since an eight-year moratorium on their development was
lifted in 2004,1 catch shares have spread rapidly throughout the United States. In the president’s federal budget
for fiscal year 2011, NMFS expressed a goal of having 20
catch share programs by 2016.2 As shown in our map on
existing U.S. catch share programs (see inside cover),3
catch shares already exist in many areas and are being
developed in other regions.
Recent studies estimate that between 28 to 63 percent of
the fish stocks in the world are depleted.4 Nationally, a long
recession and slow recovery has left the people of the United
States struggling to make ends meet. Our government’s policy
of privatizing our nation’s fisheries abdicates their responsibility for the stewardship of our resources, while causing further job losses in our coastal and fishing communities. This is
the wrong choice for our fish, fishermen and future.

The Design and Downfall of Privatized Catch
Shares
Catch share programs define the amount of fish that certain
fishermen are allowed to catch. Scientists and managers first
set the total allowable catch (TAC) of a fishery, which is the
amount of fish that all companies and individuals combined
are allowed to catch each year. The fishery managers then
determine the size of a catch share, generally a percentage of
the TAC designated for one individual. For example, one fisherman might receive 2 percent of a 1 million pound TAC of
red snapper. This means that the fisherman can catch 20,000
pounds of red snapper for the year. The percentage of TAC a
person receives is referred to as their “share” or “quota.”
Catch shares can be distributed in a number of ways, but the
most common method in the United States involves giving
away catch shares to companies and individuals based on
their catch history (how much fish they caught in the past
during a certain period of time). Once the catch shares are
given away, the owners are allowed to lease or sell their quotas in a private market system.
While this may sound like a fair approach, the reality is that
smaller fishermen who fish more slowly and catch less are
pushed out when the amount of annual catch to qualify for
shares is set high (see graphic: “How catch shares cause job
losses”). Many captains have to buy or lease quota to go fishing and this added expense equates to less money available
to pay crew members. Fishermen who leave the fishery are
left saddled with boats they can’t sell, since new entrants to
the fishery are blocked by the expensive burden of having
to buy or lease quota to fish — which can be tens or even
hundreds of thousands of dollars.5 Ultimately, the industry
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is skewed toward industrial fishing vessels employing fewer
people and using fishing methods that can be ecologically
damaging.
Catch shares are often treated as permanent property rights
even though U.S. federal law governing fisheries management expressly states they are revocable permits and cannot
be construed as rights.6 They have been bought and sold,
inherited and taxed as inheritance, used as collateral, and
fought over in divorce court.7 However, it is unclear how
well catch share quotas can be revoked or modified once
they are issued.8 In other words, the United States is rushing
down a path of fisheries management from which it cannot
easily return.
The fundamental problem with this system is that the government gives catch share owners their transferable shares for
free, and essentially in perpetuity, creating a system that keeps
the right to fish in private hands. Some argue that privatization is necessary to avoid the “tragedy of the commons.”9
The tragedy of the commons is the idea that when multiple
individuals use a common resource for their personal benefit, the resource is likely to be depleted by people trying to
get the biggest share as quickly as possible before others do
so. This happens even though destruction of the resource is
against everyone’s collective long-term interest in managing
the resource well and using it sustainably into the future. But
the United States manages many public resources without resorting to privatization — our national forests, oil and mineral
deposits, grazing lands and wireless airwaves are considered
public resources. The government holds these resources in
trust and manages them for the use and benefit of all people
in the United States. The government sells or auctions access
to them to individuals for their use or extraction.
As with other public resources, privatization is not necessary
for effective fishery management. Fish in U.S. waters belong
to the public,10 to be shared by all, for the maximum benefit
of all, not just a handful of people or companies.

Ultimately, the industry is
skewed toward industrial fishing
vessels employing fewer people
and using fishing methods that
can be ecologically damaging.

Food & Water Watch

Economic Devastation
Catch share programs are based on the idea of maximizing
the economic efficiency of the fishery. Unfortunately, this
“optimization” or “rationalization” comes at the cost of excluding large numbers of people from the system entirely. As
one researcher summarized in 2006, catch share programs
“can amount to an unjustified, and highly unpopular, transfer
of wealth from the public to specially favored individuals.
In practice, many fishermen or entrepreneurs have become
inordinately wealthy following the inception of [these] programs,”14 while others have been forced into poverty.

Distribution of Shares
While there are several different ways to determine who gets
the initial shares in a new catch share program, the most
common method used in the United States is to select a few
years of historic catch data from the fishery to determine
each fisherman’s proportional share. This initial allocation
of shares gives a huge windfall to a small group of people
and businesses. Typically, no attempt is made to collect fees

More Than a Decade of Concerns
In a review for Congress on catch share programs in
1999, the National Research Council (NRC) highlighted
eight major concerns with catch share programs:11
•

The fairness of initial allocations

•

The effects of catch shares on processors

•

Increased costs for new fishermen to gain entry

•

Consolidations of quota shares (and thus economic
power)

•

The effects of leasing

•

Confusion about the nature of the privilege involved

•

Elimination of vessels and reductions in crew

•

The equity of gifting a public trust resource12

Since the moratorium on catch share programs was
lifted in 2004, nine new catch share programs have been
implemented in the United States (there are 15 total
catch share programs as of early 2011) and more are in
development.13 These programs are plagued by many of
the same problems highlighted by the NRC more than
10 years ago, yet the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) continues to promote catch share
programs as a preferred management option for our nation’s fisheries.

or compensation for use of the public resource. Those who
receive the largest initial distribution of shares — or have the
most capital to buy and lease shares — often gain control
over an entire fishery, pushing smaller fishermen out of fishing and even into bankruptcy.15
There have also been cases where new fishing firms have
deliberately entered a fishery prior to the implementation
of catch shares in order to establish a catch history and
profit from the initial allocation of shares.23 Catch shares are
touted as a way to end the race to fish, but when fisheries are
controlled with a TAC and no other restrictions, fishermen
compete in short seasons to catch fish quickly. This speculative fishing exacerbates the race in pre-catch share years.24
Once quotas are distributed, the fishery moves rapidly
towards consolidation. In 2010, less than five months after
catch shares were implemented in the groundfish fleet in
New England, 55 out of the initial 500 boats in the fishery
controlled 61 percent of the revenue.25 In another example,
the ocean quahog fishery in the mid-Atlantic became so consolidated that one firm controlled 35 percent of the available
quota two years after the program began.26 Internationally, in
New Zealand’s catch share fisheries, “the majority of quota
was purchased and held by a small number of large-vertically
integrated companies.”27 One company, Sanford, purchased
about half its total quota, while another, Talleys, bought 99
percent of its quota. These large purchases resulted in many
small boat operators leaving the fishery.28
Many quota holders don’t even fish themselves. Instead
they become “armchair fishermen” or “fishery landlords” by
3
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Windfall Wealth and the Fish Stock Market
The initial distribution of catch shares gifts a select few
with a windfall of wealth, as it transfers the future value
of the public fishery into private ownership.16 Immediately
upon receipt, these privileged few can sell their quota and
gain an instant profit17 or they can use the expected value
as collateral to get bank loans.18 Quota owners can use
these loans to buy additional quota19 or to invest in other
industries, furthering their own personal profit.20 Many
choose to hold on to their quota, lease it to other fishermen and accrue long-term wealth without actually fishing. 21 Essentially, catch shares turn a fishery into a stock
market, where quota shares become intangible assets
with higher market values than the vessels and equipment
needed to fish, or even the fish themselves.22
leasing their quota for exorbitantly high prices. The Canadian
halibut fishery switched to a privatized catch share system
in 1991, and by 2006, 79 percent of the quota was leased
instead of fished by quota owners themselves.29 A huge financial burden was placed on the fishermen who had to pay
rent to bring in their catch. One study found that, “of the 182
active halibut fishing vessels in 2006, 37 vessels leased 90
percent or more of the halibut quota they fished, 67 vessels
leased 70 percent or more of the halibut quota they fished,
and 91 vessels (half of the active fleet) leased 50 percent or
more” of their quota.30 Quota leasing has become the single
largest operating cost for these fishermen, pushing them to
the margins of profitability,31 which could drive more fishermen into bankruptcy.32

Job Losses
As a result of this subsidized consolidation, many fisheries have lost well over half of their fishing fleets. In Alaska’s
Bristol Bay red king crab fishery (part of the Bering Sea and
Aleutian Islands crab rationalization program), only 89 out of
251 boats remained the year after catch shares were implemented.33 In early 2010, New England implemented catch
shares in the groundfish fishery through a “sector” program.
Members of the community warned, “50-75 percent of the
fleet and thousands of jobs will be lost in a relatively short
period of time.”34 Five months after the program was implemented, 253 of the 500 boats in the fishery were sitting at the
dock, unable to fish without quota.35 Those boats might stay
there, since small fishermen forced out of the system could
end up with boats that have no buyers, as the boats have no
value without quota.36
The same problems are occurring in other parts of the world
that employ privatized catch share systems. The southern
bluefin tuna fishery in Australia had approximately 70 percent fewer boats within the first two years of the initiation
4

of the catch share system.37 Between 1986 and 1998, on
average, the number of quota holders in New Zealand’s inshore fisheries (which were traditionally dominated by small
boats) dropped from 95 owners to 67 owners.38 Despite a
15 percent increase in the TAC of the New Zealand fishing
fleet, there has been a 26 percent reduction in the number
of quota owners.39 Hardest hit were the small 6 to 9 meter
length boats, while mid-sized vessels stayed stable and large
vessels increased in number.40
Quota leasing also prevents new fishermen from entering a fishery. One study estimated that it can cost between
$250,00 and $500,000 for a new entrant to acquire enough
quota for a single fishing trip in Alaska’s halibut fishery.49

How Catch Shares Cause Job Losses
1. In this hypothetical fishery, boats of three sizes (small,
medium and large) catch the imaginarifish. The regional
fishery management council maintains stocks through
regulatory limits on total allowable catch (TAC), but there
are problems with fishermen racing to catch as many
imaginarifish as possible before the TAC is reached.
2. The regional fishery management council suggests
implementing a catch share program for imaginarifish.
Because catch shares are based on catch histories,
more boats enter the fishery and those already fishing
fish harder to try to raise their catch in the hopes of getting more quota. Aggressive overfishing depletes stock,
and other fish are killed accidentally when the imaginarifish are caught, causing depletion of those fish populations as well.
3. A catch share program is implemented. The program
automatically excludes a large number of the smallest boats because their historical catch amounts do
not qualify them for shares under the new rules. Catch
shares are distributed mostly among the medium and
large boats.
4. In the first year under the catch share program, fishermen not granted enough shares to be profitable, and
other fishermen choosing to make a windfall profit, sell
or lease their quota shares. Catch shares begin to consolidate within the larger boats that have the capital to
purchase shares from the remaining fishermen. There are
now far fewer crew jobs available, and local economies
suffer as workers have less money to spend on various
goods and entertainment. Fish populations continue to
decline at the same rate, but a much smaller number
of much larger boats are catching them. These boats
use more industrialized catch methods, which can harm
ocean habitat and cause higher rates of bycatch — the
accidental catch of marine wildlife.

Food & Water Watch
Fleet Reduction Means Job Losses
“Fleet reduction” — meaning fishermen being cut out of fishing — is often highlighted as a success of catch share
programs.41 But every time a boat stops fishing, an estimated three to six jobs are lost,42 resulting in struggling coastal
and fishing communities.

Catch share program

Boats in fishery prior
to catch shares

Boats in fishery after
catch shares

Boats lost

Alaska Halibut

3,450 boats in 1994

1,156 boats in 2008

66 percent in 14 years

Alaska Sablefish

1,404 boats in 1994

362 boats in 2008

74 percent in 14 years43

Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Pollock

100 catcher and 30 catcherprocessor in 1998

90 catcher and 21 catcherprocessor in 2005

10 percent catcher and 30
percent catcher-processor in
7 years44

Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Red King
Crab

251 boats in 2004

74 boats in 2007-2008

71 percent in 3-4 years

Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Snow Crab

189 boats in 2004

78 boats in 2007-2008

59 percent in 3-4 years

Pacific Sablefish

328 boats in 2000

87 boats in 2008

73 percent in 8 years45

Gulf of Mexico Red Snapper

546 permits in 2007

466 permits in 2008

15 percent in 1 year

Wreckfish

91 boats in 1990

Less than 5 boats in 2009

95 percent in 19 years46

Surf Clam

128 boats in 1990

50 boats in 2005

61 percent in 15 years47

Ocean Quahog

92 permits in 1991

47 permits in 2005

49 percent in 14 years48

Fishermen who already have quota can use their existing
quota as leverage for loans, but fishermen just starting out
may have to use personal assets, such as their homes, for the
required downpayment (between a quarter and half of the
loan, or $62,500 to $250,000) before they can even catch
any fish.50 Purchasing the quota outright is out of reach for
most, since widespread leasing drives up the price of quota.51
Despite widespread academic agreement that catch
share programs create job loss in communities, NOAA
Administrator Jane Lubchenco recently announced that
catch shares are “merely a tool” and “not the cause” of lost
fishing jobs.52

Wage Losses for Crew Members and Captains
The precise impacts of catch shares on crew members are
relatively unknown, but the research that has been done
belies the claim that crews have safer, better jobs with higher
wages.53 Traditionally, fishing crews were given a percentage
of the total catch value, most of which was caught in a short
fishing season. Crews in fisheries under catch shares are now
spending months at sea instead of weeks, but are not making
more money.

Vessel owners are shifting the costs of leasing additional
quota onto crews by taking a large percentage of the total
catch value before calculating wages. Crew members in the
Canadian halibut fishery received 10 to 20 percent of the
catch value before catch shares and now receive only 1 to
5 percent.54 Even the fishermen who own their quota have
begun to pay their crews these same low wages, because
it is more profitable for quota owners to lease their quota
than to fish it themselves while paying their crews the wages
they used to receive.55 So, in the Canadian halibut fishery,
although the overall value of the fishery has increased by
25 percent over 17 years, the crews’ share of that value has
dropped by 73 percent.56 In the Bristol Bay red king crab and
Bering Sea snow crab fisheries, some crew members report
that pay has dropped from 5 to 6 percent of catch value to
less than 1 percent,57 while an estimated 1,214 crew members lost their jobs entirely after catch share implementation
in those fisheries.58
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Crew Life After Catch Shares in the Bering Sea
Red King Crab Fishery
In a recent report, former and current crew members and
skippers in the Bering Sea red king crab fishery described
the changes for crews after the implementation of catch
share “rationalization.”59 The crab fishery lost 177 vessels
in the four years following rationalization, causing significant unemployment.60 In interviews, the fishermen described how crews made less money after rationalization,
since owners compensated for the cost of leasing quota
by taking 70 to 80 percent of the gross value of the crab
catch before calculating crew pay.61 Many explained that
crews now work long hours for many more months.62 One
estimated that captain shares have dropped from around
14 percent of catch value to 7 percent, while crew shares
have dropped from 6 to 3 percent.63 These fishermen
generally do not consider the fishery to be any safer, since
owners only hire a minimum number of crew members and
have deadlines to meet for processors.64 Some of them
mourn the loss of their way of life and some of the small
fishing communities of Alaska.65
Some crew members’ reactions to catch shares:
“Last season I worked more months, caught as much
crab as I ever caught in my life but it was not the biggest
paycheck I’ve ever gotten. You work longer and get paid
less.”66
“They say it was for security purposes but people still die
every year. The only difference is that there are fewer boats
now, so there are less people getting hurt. But they’re doing the same work.”67
“On some boats, people are taking home more, on other
boats less. BUT the big change is that if you look at this
on a per hour basis, crew are making significantly less.
Now they are working 10 months for what they might have
made in 2 months. Much more time away from family on
top of this per hour aspect.”68
“There are less boats and crew has no opportunity. You
have to own your own boat to advance.”69
“People get into fishing to try to make a good living and
they take the risks, but the people making the money are
the people who don’t take any risks. Owners can lease out
the quotas and sit on their butts when the guys are out
there.”70
“It wasn’t just a job, it was a way of life and they took that
from me too.”71

6

Community Hardship
The economic hardship and job loss among fishermen due
to catch share programs have widespread impacts. Related
industries like processors, baiters and boat repairers also suffer, along with the ports and communities reliant on fishing.
As unemployment spreads, there is less to spend at grocery
stores, restaurants and other key community businesses,
which can eventually lead to a resident exodus in search of
jobs and opportunity.72 And generally speaking, unemployment is linked to higher risk for spousal abuse,73 child abuse
and neglect,74 and increased suicide and divorce rates.
The consolidation of fishing in a region can have profound
economic and social effects. A study of the Nova Scotia
groundfish catch share program found that transferability of
shares resulted in striking regional imbalances in consolidation, as some areas acquired quota at the expense of other
towns and ports.75 The increasing fortunes of those able to
take advantage of catch shares in these communities have
exacerbated disparities of wealth and status and put a strain
on the values of hard work and equity that held the communities together.76 Regional shifts in quota have also left
communities in Iceland and Alaska struggling to survive the
loss of their fishing tradition.77
Processors can also be hurt by quota systems, as some processors gain control of the quota and others go out of business. In the Alaska halibut and sablefish fishery, catch shares
reduced the number of halibut processors from 104 to 82
firms, only 31 of which existed before catch shares.78 Of the
51 new processing firms, four of them accounted for nearly a
fourth of the total market share.79 The halibut processors that
survived the implementation of catch shares lost upwards of
56 percent of their prior wealth due to changes in the price
of fish off the boat, wholesale prices, and exclusive deals between new processors and the now-consolidated fishermen.80
In some catch share programs, processors are also granted
quotas. In Alaska’s Bering Sea king crab fishery, a handful of
major processors ended up with exclusive buying rights to a
percentage of most crab deliveries. As a result, some processors were guaranteed an astounding 90 percent of crab deliveries, leaving fishermen with only 10 percent of the product
to deliver where they wanted.81 Meanwhile, the smaller
processors and ports that cannot arrange deals with quota
owners are often forced to close, further hurting communities
linked to small-boat fishing.82
Quotas can also change the social dynamics of a community.
Quota owners can choose to avoid the discomfort of dealing
directly with struggling fishermen by leasing through processors instead, thereby further consolidating the fishery through
vertical integration.83 These processors can then schedule
guaranteed deliveries with leasing fishermen, controlling both
supply and demand (and therefore the prices) for fresh fish.84

Food & Water Watch
Destroying Communities for Private Profit
Fishing communities are a vibrant part of the cultural
and economic fabric of the United States. Fishing provides more than just local jobs and the ability to work for
oneself or with friends, neighbors and family members; it
serves as the basis for community character and enforces a traditional form of social equity — those that work
hard gain benefits from their labor. Fishermen can maintain control over the quality and quantity of their product,
allowing them to determine how best to maximize their
personal profit, use natural resources wisely to provide
benefits now and for the future, and ensure safe and local
seafood for consumers.
This culture is being lost in the rush to implement catch
shares across the United States, as catch share programs
can force fishermen to be little more than a controlled
labor force working for private firms. In 2009, the Milken
Institute hosted a panel to discuss catch shares during a
conference that brought together CEOs, entrepreneurs,
venture capitalists and government officials.85 Staff
members from the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF),
one of they key proponents of catch shares, highlighted
the private investment opportunities of catch share programs. In the pitch to bring in investors, David Festa, vice
president of the West Coast for EDF, described fishermen
as “unskilled,” “unprofessional” and “itinerant labor that
bounces around from job to job” with “high drug use.”86
He went on to liken fisheries to ill-performing factories
that simply need outside investment to retrain workers so
that owners can turn a profit, and suggested that

the value of the fishery tends to increase by a factor of
four once the fisheries are essentially in private hands.87
He also highlighted the favorable political climate in the
federal agencies and asked for “help in pushing forward
these changes both in terms of the political process
but also in terms of bringing capital to the table to help
grease the skids.”88
Another EDF consultant at the meeting, Larry Band, expressed disregard for the lives and livelihoods of independent fishermen when he complained that “unfortunately,
as you deal with the reality of getting catch shares implemented, it’s a very democratic process with the voices of
people on the water an important part of whether or not
catch shares move forward.”89 He further suggested fleet
buy-backs as an opportunity to target smaller fishermen
who turn less profit, “giving them an honorable exit from
the industry.”90 Mr. Band likened catch shares to financial
stocks and suggested returns for investors as high as 10
to 20 times the initial value of the shares.91
Among all this discussion of outside capital investment, profit returns, trading and brokerage options, and
catch shares as financial securities, there seems to be
disregard and even disdain for the culture of traditional
smaller-scale U.S. fishermen. The long-standing dignity
and independence that fishing communities represent as
providers of seafood to U.S. consumers are being lost in
the rush to make our fisheries profitable for businessmen,
not fishermen.

Safety for Fishermen
Catch shares are touted as a sure method for increasing safety for fishermen,92 but the data is unclear that such programs
reduce accidents and deaths at sea.93 The anticipated safety
benefit of catch shares systems is that fishermen no longer
have to race for fish. However, a survey of fishermen safety in
six countries found that some fisheries managed with catch
shares, especially those with quota aggregation and quota
leasing, tended to continue to have major vessel accidents
and fishing fatalities.94 Overall, the data is mixed. Some
fisheries have experienced reductions in search and rescue
missions (for example, Alaska’s halibut and sablefish fishery
saw a 63 percent reduction in missions after catch shares
were implemented),95 while others have seen no improvement (fisheries in Iceland, New Zealand and even the United
States maintained high accident rates).96
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Fishery Health
Declining fishery health is a global problem. One study estimated 63 percent of assessed fish stocks worldwide require
lower exploitation rates so that populations can rebuild.97
Some scholars claim catch share programs are the solution
to wide-scale fisheries collapse.98 Their essential argument is
that ownership of a resource implies stewardship of that resource. By giving individuals and firms private, assured rights
to a formerly public resource, these “owners” supposedly
become invested in the long-term health of the fishery and
modify their behavior to promote sustainability.

Quota holders compete against
each other to get the best fish
from the ocean, which can lead
them to adopt practices that
damage the broader ecosystem.

This assertion has been countered in research and in history.
Resource stewardship is not inherently linked to ownership.
For instance, unsustainable farming practices on private
lands in the 1930s were a major cause of the Dust Bowl
tragedy.99 Studies have shown that it is theoretically possible
in a catch share system that fishing a stock to extinction
could bring a quota holder the most profit — another reason
why ultimate management powers should remain in the
public sector.100 Fundamentally, quota holders are individuals with no control over the fish stocks, marine environment
or the behavior of others (including other quota holders,
predators and exploitive marine industries like mining)101
and cannot be relied on to recover stocks through individual actions. This is particularly true since, while quotas
grant someone a private market asset, quota holders are still

competing against each other to get the best fish from the
ocean.102 This can lead them to adopt practices that damage
the fish stocks and the broader ecosystem.
In fact, research focusing on the implementation of the
New England groundfish sectors program suggests that the
catch shares program has replaced the traditional fishing
community focus on diverse and adaptive fishing strategies
— strategies that consider habitat, migratory patterns and
fishing gear.103 Rather than increasing fishermen’s personal
investment in the fishery and encouraging cooperation to
spur long-term sustainable management, the sector program
has motivated fishermen to attain short-term goals, such as
maximizing their quota usage and raising the value of their
quota share.104
The National Research Council concluded in 1999 that
“much of the political support for [catch shares] is similarly
driven by faith in the assumption that privatization will foster
ecological sensibility.”105 The NRC felt that catch shares may
promote conservation by keeping catch below the TAC, but
only with proper monitoring, enforcement and penalties for
violators.106 As highlighted in their opinion, the key management strategy to ensure conservation is the existence of a
biologically based TAC, with catch shares being one way, but
not the only way, to implement this conservation strategy.107
Essentially, two goals are being conflated: the goal to return
stocks to sustainable levels and the goal to create economic
efficiency by reducing the number of fishermen.108
Most catch share programs, however, have been put into
place in fisheries where overfishing had already been reduced or eliminated through other management scenarios,
most commonly through catch limits such as TACs.109 By
distributing quota based on historical catch amounts, catch
share programs may actually be rewarding those that fish the
hardest and fastest using gear associated with more environmental problems, but that boost catch quantity.110 For
example, industrial-scale “factory fish” boats frequently use
equipment that can catch large amounts of fish quickly, but
can also damage the ocean floor and kill other wildlife unnecessarily in the process.111

8

Food & Water Watch
Stock Assessments
There is much debate as to whether fish stocks recover or
decline as a consequence of catch shares. Recent studies
disagree on the issue. One study that focused on the landings
data of over 11,000 fisheries concluded that, on average, the
121 fisheries managed by catch shares were less prone to
collapse.112 However, this study has been criticized for failing to differentiate between landings increases due to catch
shares management and landings increases due to the enforcement of a sustainable catch limit.113 An opposing study
painted a much more complicated picture by looking at fish
numbers, use of habitat-damaging gear and commercial
landings data in 15 North American catch share programs.
The author concluded that results varied widely between
programs and that the implementation of catch shares in
these 15 separate regional examples did not ensure ecological sustainability.114

Fish populations under some of the most mature catch share
systems in the world are still overfished. In New Zealand, the
percentage of assessed stocks below target levels increased
from 15 percent to more than 30 percent between 2006 and
2010. In 2010, almost a quarter of New Zealand fish stocks
experienced overfishing, 6 percent were collapsed and 13
percent were depleted.115 In another example, Norway’s cod
stocks dropped to the lowest quota ever available in 2006
after years of catch share management.116 Meanwhile, U.S.
catch share programs have shown little evidence that quotas
are increasing fish stocks. For instance, the Alaskan sablefish
population, managed under catch shares since 1995, tended
to have lower TACs after this catch share program was implemented, as seen in Figure 1.117 And recent TACs in Iceland’s
fisheries have almost uniformly been reduced due to declining populations, as shown in Figure 2.118
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Figure 1: Catch Shares Have Failed to Increase TACs in the Alaskan Sablefish Fishery119
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Figure 2: The State of Fish Stocks* in Iceland120
Species

Landings in 2009 (in
pounds)

Recommended TAC for
2010/2011 (in pounds)

Percent change

Cod

401,240,000

352,740,000

12 percent decrease

Haddock

180,780,000

99,210,000

45 percent decrease

Pollock (Saithe)

134,480,000

88,180,000

34 percent decrease

Golden redfish

85,980,000

66,140,000

23 percent decrease

Icelandic slope redfish

41,890,000

22,050,000

47 percent decrease

Deep pelagic redfish

114,640,000

44,090,000

62 percent decrease

Greenland halibut

59,520,000

11,020,000

81 percent decrease

Plaice

13,890,000

14,330,000

3 percent increase

Wolffish (Atlantic catfish)

33,950,000

18,740,000

45 percent decrease

Ling

24,250,000

16,530,000

32 percent decrease

Tusk

18,300,000

13,230,000

28 percent decrease

Great silver smelt

23,810,000

17,640,000

26 percent decrease

*Only species with 2009 landings greater than 10,000,000 pounds are included, with the exception of the lumpsucker, summer spawn herring, Norwegian
spring spawning herring, blue whiting, mackerel and pearlside, which did not have recommended TACs for 2010/2011 at time of publication and are therefore excluded from this table.

Discarding
Stocks can continue to decline under catch shares due to a
number of problems inherent in the system design. One of
these flaws pushes fishermen to discard some of their catch.
By restricting fishermen to the amount of fish in their quota
and making it too expensive to acquire additional quota,
fishermen may feel compelled to discard smaller fish that will
bring in less profit at the dock. This process, called “highgrading,” can result in dead or dying fish tossed overboard,
depleting fish stocks while yielding no profit for fishermen.
Discarding and high-grading have been described as “an
almost inevitable outcome of quota-managed fisheries.”121
The implementation of catch shares typically increases pressure to discard and high-grade, particularly in multi-species
fisheries.122 In the Icelandic cod fishery, small cod is only
slightly above quota price. Predicted levels of discard due to
high-grading are 4.7 percent for gillnetting (a type of netbased fishing) and 2.7 percent for longline fishing (a method
using lines with baited hooks), while observations estimate
it to be 3 percent and 1 percent, respectively.123 Collectively
speaking, this means a lot: Modeling suggests that gillnet
and longline vessels discard 67 percent and 25 percent of
their total small cod catch, respectively.124 An existing ban on
discarding fish in Iceland is therefore ineffective.
Bycatch — marine wildlife that is unintentionally caught
while fishing for other species — can also increase under
10

catch share programs. For example, catch shares could
increase the risk of fishermen catching endangered sea
turtles in the Gulf of Mexico, as they are more likely to be
accidently caught with some types of gear than others.125
Furthermore, fishery recovery efforts are hampered when
bycatch is not reported, a problem that can intensify under
catch share programs. In 2005, New Zealand’s largest fishery
noted that unmonitored boats, particularly those with foreign
owners, significantly underreported their bycatch.126
The United States already has high levels of discarding,
and it is unlikely that catch share programs will improve
the situation. In 2002, estimates suggest that U.S. fisheries
discarded 2.33 billion pounds of fish while landing 8.19
billion pounds, a discard-to-landings ratio of 0.28 — one of
the highest in the world.127 Three methods are suggested to
reduce bycatch: modifying existing gear, changing to more
selective gear (for example, changing from drift gill net fishing to trolling or from trawls to traps), and reducing fishing
effort.128 Low-impact fishing could be incentivized through
better fisheries management. Unfortunately, the reverse is
currently happening: Larger boats with less selective fishing
methods are becoming dominant in the new privatized and
consolidated catch share fisheries around the world.
Unreported catches can have major consequences for fishery
management. Statistics are distorted, leading to inaccuracies in stock assessments, resulting in lowered TACs. In turn,
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lowered TACs further incentivize unreported catches. In the
extreme case, severe underreporting could lead to fisheries
collapse.129

Monitoring
The success of catch share programs depends significantly on
good data collection from both quota and non-quota holders
who fish in related fisheries. Unreported landings, high-grading and discarding all weaken and can destroy the market for
quota shares.130 One of the only fisheries with significant and
proven reductions in discard rates is the multispecies groundfish trawl fishery in British Columbia, which has 100 percent
at-sea observer coverage and dockside monitoring.131 At-sea
observer coverage curbs discarding and high-grading, while
dockside check-ins verify catch amounts and help maintain quotas and TAC in real-time. Without these monitoring
measures, catch shares cannot be a successful management
tool, and most fisheries do not have these extensive methods
in place.

fishermen. For example, in the New England sectors program, which the NRC highlighted as one of the most difficult
regions to monitor and enforce (due to the large number
of small boats and numerous ports),139 the necessary improvements for monitoring the catch shares program were
estimated by a local research institute to cost between $6
million and $12 million.140 While the federal government
will be subsidizing much of the initial implementation,141 onboard observer costs are estimated to stay at $700 to $1,000
a trip.142 While large quota holders will have few problems
paying, smaller fishermen, who are already working at the
margins of profitability and suffering the additional costs of
quota leases, may not be able to endure. Without long-term
federal support, monitoring costs could drive the remaining
small fishermen out of the industry.

Illegal landings, in which fish are caught and sold without
proper documentation, are also a problem in quota-regulated
fisheries. Illegal landings are estimated to be between 10
and 30 percent of the legal catch weight in fisheries.132 And
contrary to the common assumption that getting around the
quota limit in a quota-regulated fishery leads to less demand
for quotas and therefore lower prices for them, poorly managed catch share fisheries can result in both raised quota
prices and significant non-compliance. 133 This is because
non-compliant boats can more easily hide their illegal catch
if they are already catching a very large amount of fish,
which raises the demand for quota. Essentially, it is harder for
someone monitoring the boats to notice 100 pounds of illegal catch if it is mixed in with 1,000 pounds of legal catch.134
The United States struggles with data collection and enforcement. In recent years, the National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS) only analyzed 66 fishing trips of catch share program
vessels in the Gulf of Mexico red snapper fishery in 2009
and 55 in 2008.135 In 2009, 1,898 red snapper were kept
while 2,245 (more than half of the total catch) were caught
accidently and then discarded, were discarded dead, or met
some other unknown fate rather than being sold at dockside.136 These bycatch numbers were significantly worse than
the 2008 numbers,137 when only about a quarter of the total
red snapper catch was discarded. This indicates that catch
shares do not minimize bycatch problems over time and
might actually make them worse.
The National Research Council (NRC) suggested catch share
programs could improve data collection and enforcement by
levying fees to fund on-board and/or dockside-monitoring
programs.138 New catch share programs in the United States
are looking for ways to pass those costs on to fishermen, but
the systems proposed could only further hurt smaller-scale
11
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The Dubious Legal Grounds for Catch
Shares
The fish in our nation’s waters are public resources, held
in the public trust for the people of the United States.143 As
such, the government has the responsibility to promote access while balancing conservation needs and to compensate
the public for any private use of the resource.144
The NRC complied a list of four key ramifications of the public trust doctrine for catch share programs:
First, in light of the essential inalienability of public trust
resources, it reinforces concerns about the “giveaway” of
public resources to private interests. Second, it confers on
government a continuing duty of supervision and a responsibility to choose courses of action least destructive to trust
resources. Third, it strengthens the principle set forth in the
Magnuson-Stevens Act [the primary federal law on fisheries
management] that individual quotas are privileges, creating
no property rights and therefore subject to modification or
revocation without compensation to their holders. Finally,
it suggests that conferring exclusive rights of use should be
accompanied by some form of compensation to the public.145
Despite the NRC’s warnings that the policy of ocean privatization through catch share programs treads dangerously
close to betraying the public trust, NMFS continues to promote quota systems for all federally managed fisheries in the
United States.
Under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and
Management Act (referred to subsequently as the Act), all
fishery management plans, not just catch share programs, are
instructed to “take into account the importance of fishery resources to fishing communities … in order to (A) provide for
the sustained participation of such communities, and (B) to
the extent practicable, minimize adverse economic impacts
on such communities.”146 But as shown in previous sections,
catch share programs are rife with adverse economic impacts
on small fishermen and communities. The programs frequently fail to meet specific requirements to provide “fair and
equitable initial allocations” of quota, prevent “excessive”
consolidation, and set aside portions of the catch for entrylevel fishermen and small-vessel owners and crews.147
Furthermore, catch share programs are being implemented
with a disingenuous presentation of cost. The Act requires
management costs of catch share programs to be fully
recovered through program administration, but in 2005 the
Government Accountability Office criticized NMFS for failing to do just that.148 Since costs are not always recovered,
the U.S. public is essentially funding the administration and
management of a private industry making money from a public resource — one that the public can no longer access.

12

The dubious legal standing of privatized catch share programs extends into international law as well. Most notably,
fishermen in Iceland, fed up with paying significant leasing
costs to private quota holders for the ability to fish a public
resource, took their grievances before the United Nations
Human Rights Committee. After reviewing the issue, the
committee ruled that privatized catch share systems violated
international law and the human rights of fishermen.149
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Learning from International Experience
More than 10 percent of the total ocean fish catch is currently taken under catch share programs.150 Many of these
programs have run into enormous problems with design,
management and legality. Understanding their failures and
successes should help the United States avoid the same mistakes and achieve similar successes.

Iceland – An Illegal System
Fishing is a major industry for Iceland, accounting for 37
percent of product merchandise exports and 8 percent of the
gross domestic product in 2008.151 After experimenting with
catch shares in the 1980s, Iceland extended the program
to all its major fisheries in the Fisheries Management Act of
1990.152 The 19 species subject to catch shares in Iceland accounted for more than 97 percent of the value of catch taken
in Iceland’s waters in 2005.153
Iceland’s catch share system mirrors the privatized quota
model closely. Fisheries are subject to TAC limits, quotas are
assets of indefinite duration that can be divided and transferred and are subject to fees, and fishery managers initially
allocate quotas based on catch history.154 Other measures,
such as gear restrictions, size limits and fishing closures, are
also used.155
Iceland’s fisheries have consolidated significantly under catch
shares — large, vertically integrated companies have come
to dominate the seas. People often use feudal metaphors to
describe the current political economy of fishing in Iceland.
For instance, people refer to large catch share holders as
“lords of the sea” because they dictate who gets to fish and
they control the quantities and quota-leasing rates.156
Since its implementation, the Icelandic catch share system
has endured numerous legal and social challenges. Initially,
the only boats allowed in a fishery were those grandfathered
in when the quota system was enacted. In 1998, the Supreme
Court of Iceland found this rule was unconstitutional on the
grounds that it treated citizens unfairly.157 After this ruling,
new fishermen could be licensed to fish, but still had to acquire quota on the market — meaning they must purchase it
from others. This has been exceedingly difficult for new fishermen, who do not have the advantage of leveraging existing
quotas for loans.
Catch shares have generated a great deal of wealth for a
few,158 but at the cost of many. A variety of affected community members oppose the program: small-vessel owners who
entered the system after quota allocation; fishing crew members, especially those who work on vessels with reduced
quota or who are forced by the vessel owners to help pay for
quota purchases; and community groups and inhabitants of
small fishing villages and towns where people have lost their

jobs due to insufficient quota or none at all.159 Communities
have not been eligible for quota under the Icelandic system,
only individuals, and as quota has consolidated in larger
ports, small town inhabitants have suffered from increased
unemployment160
Iceland attempted to alleviate the unequal distribution of
wealth under the system and make the industry more accessible to new fishermen161 by instituting a catch fee, starting at
6 percent in 2004 and increasing to 9.5 percent by 2009.162
The government levies this fee in addition to fees for monitoring, enforcement and stock assessments.163 Studies have
shown that a 9.5 percent catch fee is still too low to even
recover costs from fishing subsidies,164 meaning that the public is forced to finance at least some portion of the privatized
profits of the industry.
Ultimately, several fishermen took their case to the United
Nations Human Rights Committee, alleging that privatization violated the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights by forcing fishermen without quotas to pay money to
a privileged group of citizens (the quota holders) in order to
pursue their occupation.
In Oct 2007, the committee sided with the fishermen, ruling
that Iceland’s privatized catch share market violated international law.165 The majority of the committee members argued
that quota no longer used by the original holders should
revert to the state for equitable allocation.
The Icelandic government is currently investigating ways
to dismantle its catch share programs in light of this court
finding, as well as the widespread sentiment in Iceland that
catch shares are unfair and accusations that speculative
investments by fishermen with windfall catch share profits
contributed to Iceland’s 2008 economic collapse.166 The
Icelandic government is expected to send another wave of
bankruptcy through the fisheries when it recalls these catch
share permits.167 The fishermen cut out of the system by the
catch shares program will not be compensated, as Iceland
has stated that doing so would be too expensive and could
expose them to a host of lawsuits.168

New Zealand – The Social Costs of Vertical
Integration
New Zealand’s catch share program, called the Quota
Management System (QMS) manages 100 commercially significant fish stocks that contributed more than $1 billion dollars in export revenues in 2000.169 The QMS has even fewer
regulatory restrictions than Iceland’s program170 — quotas
are granted explicitly in perpetuity and are fully transferable
between citizens, making the quotas very susceptible to consolidation issues.171 New Zealand’s policies have led directly
to major reductions in the number of small-scale fishermen,
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leaving a fleet dominated by vertically integrated companies
with large vessels.
Before adopting catch shares, New Zealand first reduced
its fishing fleet by 37 percent by excluding all part-time
(small-scale) fishermen from commercial fishing.172 The QMS
initially distributed quota in 1986 as specific weights of fish,
but soon changed its allocations to percentages of the TAC.173
As soon as one year later, small-scale operators were already
losing ground to firms accumulating quota. By the end of
1987, nine companies owned 86 percent of the lucrative
orange roughy quota.174
Smaller-scale fishermen have generally lost their place in the
fishery under the combined weight of “reductions in TACs to
rebuild stocks, increases in cost recovery levies [fees], high
aggregations limits, aging of fishery participants, and the
vertically-integrated seafood companies’ desire to increase
quota holdings.”175
The government of New Zealand has placed some limits on
the aggregation of quotas, but fishermen often circumvent
them by establishing multiple holding companies and placing quotas in family trusts, rather than keeping all their quota
in a single pot.176 For example, in 1998, “a single company
in a relatively small fishery (in terms of numbers of entrants)
used three holding and allied companies to hold 24, 22,
and 171 tons of catching rights.”177 Companies can also be
exempted from aggregation limits. Exemptions allowing the
aggregation of 35 to 45 percent of stock were common between 1988 and 1999, and in some cases, officials have allowed an exemption for owning quota for an entire stock.178
In 1997, two companies each received 45 percent of the fish
stock of alfonsino and barracuda.179
The result is large-scale consolidation and vertical integration
by firms buying significant amounts of quota. In 1996, one
study found that the 10 largest companies owned 75 percent
of the shares and purchased between 46 and 100 percent of
their quota.180 Two of the companies, Sealord and Sanford,
increased their quota holdings from 10.7 to 25.5 percent
and 9.5 to 20.2 percent, respectively.181 Economic efficiency
in New Zealand has come at the cost of the jobs of 3,000
small-scale fishermen and social upheaval in small fishing
communities.182
Catch share supporters regard consolidation as a positive
outcome, arguing that there are currently too many boats
chasing too few fish, and reducing the number of boats will
lead to healthier fish populations.183 But despite significant
consolidation in New Zealand, many of their fish populations are still struggling. (See Figure 2 on page 10.)
New Zealand’s QMS has also had many legal battles over
fishing rights with the indigenous population, the Maori.184
After courts found that the QMS violated the 1840 Treaty of
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Waitangi, the New Zealand government settled by purchasing quota and a share in one of the largest fishing companies
in New Zealand and transferring it to the tribes.185 Essentially
the government was forced to buy, for the equivalent of more
than $100 million U.S. dollars,186 a public resource from a
private entity in order to transfer it to another private entity.
The Maori are still the majority holders of that company.187

Namibia – Holistic Fisheries Management: A
National Benefit
When Namibia gained its independence from South Africa
in 1990, it inherited fisheries greatly depleted by decades of
overexploitation by European and Eastern Bloc countries.188
Faced with the challenges of restoring both fisheries stocks
and the security of its citizens, Namibia developed a catch
share program that derives financial benefits for both fishermen and citizens. This program exemplifies that catch share
systems can be implemented in ways that avoid the pitfalls
of privatization and job loss inherent in the current U.S. approach to catch shares.
Namibia is one of the top 10 fishing nations in the world,189
catching large amounts of hake, horse mackerel and pilchard.190 Similar to the United States, Namibia regards fish
in its territorial waters as a natural resource belonging to the
Namibian citizens.191 Namibia manages their stocks by setting a TAC for seven key species and distributing non-transferable individual quotas among rights holders.192 Essentially,
the Namibian government acts as a leasing manager for the
fish and collects rents for the right to catch fish.
Namibia uses its catch share program to incentivize management goals important to the country, such as increasing the employment of its citizens and correcting for years
of pervasive human rights injustices under South Africa’s
apartheid system.193 Fishing rights are granted for limited
periods of time (seven, 10, 15 or 20 years), depending on the
level of investment in the fishery and the level of Namibian
ownership and employment, among other factors.194 In
2005, 13,500 people were employed in Namibian fisheries, of which 5,575 (68 percent of whom were Namibians)
were employed with on-board vessels and 7,925 (98 percent
of whom were Namibians) worked ashore.195 Rights and
quota are not freely transferable, “so as not to undermine the
Government’s goals of Namibianisation and empowerment
within the sector.”196 In 2003, Namibians held 162 of the 163
distributed fishing rights.197
As one of the few countries in the world to successfully
capture significant resource rents,198 Namibia collects several
fees from the fishery sector: quota fees, a fee specifically to
fund research and training, a fee on bycatch, and license
fees for vessels and processing facilities.199 Fees totaled about
$13.2 million in 2003.200 Unlike catch share programs in
the United States, there are no leasing fees to catch share
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holders and no windfall profits. Fees are discounted based
on Namibianisation criteria such as “degree of Namibian
ownership, employment of Namibian crew, and whether fish
was landed and/or processed in Namibia.”201 Namibia’s fishing companies also contributed more than $5 million over
14 years for the construction of schools, clinics and other
needed civic facilities.202
Namibia’s fisheries are finding the balance between profitability and sustainability. The fishing sector is consistently
the second-largest sector of the Namibian economy203 and
in 2005 it contributed $372.2 million to Namibia’s gross
domestic product, up from $97.8 million a decade earlier (a
380 percent increase).204 At the same time, many Namibian
stocks are recovering from decades of foreign overfishing
through active management of TACs.205 For example, the
hake TAC grew from 132.3 million pounds in 1990206 to
286.6 million pounds in 2006,207 and catches are anticipated
to increase in the future.208
The Namibian system is not a perfect model for the complex
fisheries of the United Sates. Because of its short history,
the Namibian fishery has relatively few fishing vessels and
they tend to be larger, older and fuel-inefficient.209 Almost
all of the catch is delivered to two ports, making it easier
to achieve high monitoring and enforcement rates.210 But
despite these caveats, the United States should learn from
Namibia’s commitment to sustainably maintaining its fish
stock, incentivizing social and environmental goals, and
sharing the benefits derived from catching fish equitably
among the fishermen and citizens of its country.

Catch Shares Aren’t Fair
There is no question that our nation’s fisheries require
responsible management systems to ensure their long-term
health and profitability. The federal government has a duty to

manage our fish for the benefit of the public. The assumption
that only privatization can achieve this is false. Following the
“common pool resources” research by Nobel Prize-winning
economist Elinor Ostrom, a recent analysis of fisheries has
shown that there are many paths to effective co-management
of fisheries resources between the public and the government.211 Quota systems may be a part of the answer, but they
must not relinquish control of the resource.
As discussed in detail in this report, catch share systems, as
implemented throughout the United States and the world,
have typically resulted in an unfair giveaway of public
resources to private entities. The gains in economic efficiency hailed by supporters of catch shares have come at
the expense of the livelihoods of thousands of smaller-scale,
traditional fishermen and their communities, and the claims
of increased fishery sustainability and safety are often overblown. The design of catch share programs has violated the
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Management Act, and international courts have found them in violation of human rights.
While FWW believes that allocating total allowable catch to
fishermen can be one of many effective tools in addressing
the modern challenges of fishery management, these programs must be rigorously designed to ensure that they retain
public control of fishery resources and return a portion of the
value of each fishery to the public. Allocations to fishermen
must be fair and equitable, and the programs should include
incentives to maintain a diverse fleet, minimize damage to
the environment, allow new participants in the fishery, improve stock assessments and fund community development.
By making sure that fishermen are part of the management
process and are treated fairly, we can ensure that they belong
to healthy communities and catch the fish in our markets using the best available practices. This promotes a better life for
our nation’s fishermen and coastal and fishing communities,
and a better product for consumers.
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Appendix
Management Specifics of Selected Catch Share
Programs
For the sake of clarity, we have chosen the term “catch share
program” for discussion in this report, but in practice, these
programs go by many names and have different management
forms. We present here a short list of some of these programs
with their official or more detailed names.

United States
•

Alaska IFQ halibut and sablefish program (1995) – IFQ
and CDQ

•

Western Alaska community development program (1992)
– CDQ

•

Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands non-pollack cooperatives (2008) – LAPP and cooperatives

•

Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands American Fisheries Act
pollock cooperatives (1999) – cooperatives

•

Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Crab (King and Tanner)
rationalization program (2005) – quota share and IFQ;
harvester cooperatives; processor quota share and IPQ;
CDQ.

•

Central Gulf of Alaska rockfish (2007) – cooperative
program

International
•

New Zealand: ITQ though the Quota Management
System (QMS)

•

Canada: British Columbia halibut fishery – ITQ

•

Canada: Scotia-Fundy inshore mobile gear groundfish
fishery – ITQ

•

Canada: British Columbia groundfish trawl fishery - ITQ

•

Australia: Southern Bluefin tuna fishery – ITQ

•

Norway: Norwegian North Sea cod fishery – IVQ

•

Iceland: ITQ

•

Namibia: Individual quota (non-transferable)

Acronyms
CDQ

Community development quota

IFQ

Individual fishing quota

ITQ

Individual transferable quota

IVQ

Individual vessel quota

•

Northeast (or New England) multispecies groundfish sector (2010) – sectors

LAPP

Limited access privilege program

•

Georges Bank cod fixed gear sector (2006) – sectors,
subsumed by the Northeast multispecies sectors

NAS

National Academy of Sciences

NMFS National Marine Fisheries Service

•

Georges Bank cod hook sector (2004) – sectors, subsumed by the Northeast multispecies sectors

•

Atlantic sea scallop IFQ (2010) – IFQ

•

Gulf of Mexico grouper and tilefish IFQ (2010) – IFQ

•

Gulf of Mexico red snapper IFQ (2007) – IFQ

•

Mid-Atlantic golden tilefish IFQ (2009) – IFQ

•

Surf clam and ocean quahog ITQ (1990) – ITQ

•

Pacific Sablefish permit stacking program (2002) – permit
stacking, IFQ

•

Pacific groundfish trawl rationalization (2011) – IFQ and
cooperatives

•

Wreckfish ITQ program (1992) – ITQ
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NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NRC

National Research Council

QMS

Quota Management System (New Zealand)

TAC

Total allowable catch
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Glossary
At-sea observer coverage
Fisheries monitoring where impartial observers inspect and
identify the types and quantities of fish caught by a vessel in
a fishing trip.

Fishery
An industry of fishing defined by a combination of factors,
including the target fish species, a geographic area of fishing,
fishing methods and gear types.

Bycatch
Fish caught during the targeting of one fish species that are
not of that species. These may be kept or discarded, depending on regulatory and economic motivators.

Fishery management plan (FMP)
A management plan for a fishery operating in federal waters
(typically between three and 200 nautical miles from shore).
In the United States, these plans are produced by a regional
fishery management council and authorized by the secretary
of commerce.

Catch and trade
A fishery management system that caps the amount of fish
that fishermen can catch using a total allowable catch and
then portions out amounts of it to individuals. See also: catch
shares.
Catch history
The qualifying years of catch records for individual fishermen
that fishery managers typically use during the planning of a
catch share system to determine the percentage of quota to
distribute in the initial allocation of shares.
Catch shares
A fishery management system that divides a fishery’s total allowable catch into discrete amounts that are gifted to individuals, communities or associations. There are many forms of
catch share programs, including individual transferable quota
systems and individual fishing quota systems.

Fleet reduction
The removal of boats and fishermen from a fishery — one of
the intended outcomes of catch shares programs.
Gear restrictions
Limits placed on the type of gear used in a fishery. These may
include gear type, amount and techniques.
Groundfish
A term loosely applied to some commercially harvested fish;
this group includes flounder, sole, pollock, cod and haddock.
High-grading
A practice where fishermen discard lower-value fish of a
targeted species in favor of keeping higher-value fish.

Catcher-processor
A very large fishing vessel that both catches fish and processes them on-board.

Individual fishing quota
A tool where fishery managers allocate a certain portion,
usually a percentage, of the total allowable catch (TAC) to
individual vessels, fishermen or other designated recipients.

Common-pool resources
Resources that are held for public use, such as fish, groundwater, national forests and public grazing lands.

Individual transferable quota
An individual fishing quota that can be sold, leased, or given
without penalty to another fisherman.

Community development quota
Generally, an allocation of quota to a subsistence or artisanal
fishing community. Fishery managers typically give them to
communities that would otherwise be excluded or disadvantaged by catch share programs.

Limited access privilege program (LAPP)
The term used in the Magnuson-Stevens Act (the Act) for the
broad range of programs commonly called catch share programs. More specifically, LAPPs issue permits for a portion of
the total allowable catch (TAC). LAPPS do not include community development quota as defined under the Act.

Discard
Fish that are caught and then released instead of brought to
market. These fish may be alive, dead or in unknown health.
Dockside monitoring
Fisheries monitoring where impartial observers inspect and
identify the types and quantity of fish caught when they are
brought into port.
Finfish
Vertebrate and cartilaginous fish species, excluding crustaceans, mollusks and cephalopods.

Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management
Act
The federal legislation that establishes fishery management
councils and the mandatory and discretionary guidelines for
fishery management plans in the United States.
Multispecies fishery
A fishery where fishermen catch more than one species
simultaneously. Most fisheries are multispecies due to the
imprecise nature of fishing gear.
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National Academy of Sciences (NAS)
A private nonprofit society of scientists that advises Congress
on federal government and technical matters.

Total allowable catch (TAC)
The total amount of fish that fishery managers will permit
fishermen to catch in a fishery, typically in a given year.

National Marine Fishery Services (NMFS)
The federal agency within NOAA that oversees fisheries science and regulation.

Tragedy of the commons
The idea that multiple individuals will exploit and even
deplete a common resource for their personal benefit, even
when it is against everyone’s collective long-term interest.

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association (NOAA)
The federal agency within the Department of Commerce
responsible for ocean and coastal management.
National Research Council (NRC)
The operating arm of the National Academy of Sciences.
New Zealand Quota Management System (QMS)
The overall fisheries management system in New Zealand.
Open access
A condition in which access to a fishery is unrestricted by
permits, quota, gear type or other limits.
Overfishing
Fishing that reduces fish stocks to a level below the rate at
which the fish naturally replace themselves.
Permit
A type of license that limits access to a fishery.
Quota
A percentage or amount of fish that fishermen can harvest.
Race for fish
A situation where fishermen compete to catch fish in a
fishery with a total allowable catch (TAC) but no other
restrictions.
Rationalization
The term Alaskans use to describe their catch share management program for crab fisheries.
Sectors management
A type of catch shares program in the New England multispecies fishery, where fishery managers distribute quota to
groups of owners (sectors) instead of individual owners.
Speculative fishing
A practice where new fishing firms enter a fishery to establish
a history of catch, in anticipation of windfall profits from new
catch shares management.
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Vertical integration (in fisheries)
A process in which individual fishing operations seek to
control different stages of fish handling (catching, processing,
marketing).
Windfall profit
A sudden influx of wealth created when fishery managers
give quota to a limited number of fishermen in a catch share
fishery.
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